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1. From Analytics to Synthetics: Kant’s Heritage and
Peirce’s Pragmatism 
1 Peirce’s  pragmatism introduces many new philosophical  tools  – suffice it  to mention
semiotic, abductive logic, a heuristic based on continuity, scholastic realism – all essential
components  of  a  never  fully  realized  broader  philosophical  project.  Peirce  usually
identified it as ‘the truth of continuity’ or ‘the truth of synechism’ (Peirce 1998: 335), or
else the method of justifying the ‘nature of Sequence,’ namely the nature of pragmatism,
the rule that enables to know meanings through conceivable effects.  But this project
required  a  vast  panoptic  view  necessarily  covering  different  fields,  according  to  a
particular order. An ordered list of topics could be the one proposed in ‘Prolegomena to
an Apology for Pragmaticism’ (Peirce 1931-35: vol. 4, § 530-84): continuity, phaneroscopy,
signs, existential graphs, kinds of reasoning. In the drafts and the articles of the series
written for The Monist (1905-06) he stressed also the role of normative sciences. In that
entire series and in the following years he tried in vain to fully explain this or a similar
order he had in mind.
2 These efforts were ‘in vain’ because Peirce tended to lose his track while tilling the ‘virgin
soil’ (Peirce 1931-35: vol. 1, § 128) of those many fields of research he himself discovered.
And here a complementary question arises: why did he get lost? Part of the reason is that
all the above topics were products of his original insight, and Peirce was eager to explain
them precisely. The mathematical definition of continuity stemmed from his thirty years
of  studying  Cantor’s  set  theory,  and  Peirce  had  independently  discovered  Cantor’s
theorem  and  Cantor’s  subsequent  paradox.  Peirce  could  not  know  that  Cantor  had
discovered the same paradox and, in contrast with the German mathematician, he saw
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the immense philosophical impact of this discovery. But in his lectures and in his papers
or drafts he spent a lot of time explaining the mathematical basis of the theorem and,
after 1900, of the paradox, saving little time and space for their philosophical impact. As a
result, his articles and manuscripts often treat either the mathematical explanation alone
or the philosophical consequence alone, and it is difficult to put the two together.
3 Another part of the reason for the lack of a final systematization is that Peirce did not get
lost for lack of direction but for failing to get out of his analytic pattern. What does that
mean? According to Kant, an analytic judgment subsumes a predicate under a subject,
while a synthetic judgment has to look outside the subject-concept into experience, to
capture how the predicate is connected to, but not subsumed within, the concept. As
Quine, and Kripke after him, stressed, in Kant’s work analysis, aprioricity, and necessity
form a circular cluster where any element justifies, but also coincides with, the others.
Analytic judgments are necessary because they are a priori, and being a priori they are
necessary  and  hence  analytic.  In  this  way  logic  (analysis),  epistemic  (a  priori),  and
metaphysical  (necessary)  levels  coincide,  furnishing the pattern of  true or warranted
knowledge. 
4 But Kant’s aim was not at all the defense of the uniqueness of analytic judgments. He was
aware  that,  as  much  as  analytic  judgments  are  important,  they  do  not  bring  about
acquisition of new knowledge, which is characteristic of synthesis. What is the kind of
synthesis Kant was looking for? There is a synthesis which is only the reverse of analysis.
This is the operation of combining elements that come from the ‘dissection of concepts’
produced by analysis. Once we have broken up the concept of the subject, we can work on
the elements we found.
5 The other  ‘synthesis’  is  the  one  which gives  ‘unity.’  But  when Kant  talks  about  the
original  synthetic  unity  of  apperception  as  the  kind  of  combination  that  analysis
presupposes, he qualifies it as ‘pure,’ not empirical, ‘one and the same’ (Kant 1781/87,
177, B 132). The unity that this pure apperception creates is ‘transcendental’ (ibid.), and
‘precedes  a  priori  all  my determinate  thought’  (Kant  1781/87,  177,  B  135).  Synthesis
precedes analysis but the character of universality (here conjoined with ‘sameness’) and
aprioricity would shape it  according to the analytic pattern, which remains the ideal
sample of every knowledge.
6 Summing up, the idea of knowledge is really founded upon an analytic pattern, and that
is why Kant seeks to solve the problem of knowledge by using critical, that is, analytic
tools  only.  Kant  provides  an  analytic  of  synthetic  judgments  whereby  he  defines
(analytically) the steps through which we arrive at a synthetic representation of reality.
Only by breaking down this path step by step is Kant assured of having caught the gist of
what knowledge is. The only real synthesis would come up with the critique of judgment,
but once again it will have a form that combines (adds to one another) elements of the
two previous critiques. In this way Kant simply systematized the long heritage of Western
philosophy, but he made it clear that theoretical or pure knowledge is either analytic or
something that is analyzable, namely broken down into necessary, a priori pieces.
7 Young  Peirce  shows  no  awareness  of  the  complex,  presupposed  circularity  among
aprioricity, analyticity, and necessity. But he had enough philosophical insight to sense
immediately that something was missing. As early as 1869, in ‘Validity of the Laws of
Logic,’ he pointed out that far more fundamental than the question of the possibility of
synthetic apriori  reasoning was that of  the possibility of  synthetic judgments merely
(Peirce 1981-2010: vol. 2, 267-8). Peirce wanted to go farther than his German master in
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criticizing judgments, and to do so he got rid of the a priori principle. A different path of
reasoning was needed, and Peirce tried to provide it through both semiotics and the a
posteriori method of science. Accordingly, Peirce listed aprioricity as one of the weak
ineffective methods for fixing a belief (Peirce 1981-2010: vol. 3, 252-3). The method of
science always remained for Peirce an a posteriori method; he spent his life trying to
explain and justify the nature of ‘ampliative’  reasoning,  another phrase for synthetic
reasoning.
8 However, when in the 1877-78 Popular Science Monthly series Peirce gave the justification
for induction – which at the time he thought included also hypotheses – he surprisingly
relied metaphorically on an ‘extension’ of the a priori principle (Peirce 1981-2010: vol. 3,
304). It is of course a rhetorical expedient, since Peirce’s conception of experience had
already been forged in the semiotic a posteriori hearth, but it is still a significant episode.
9 Peirce  would  then  explain  that  synthetic  inference  is  founded  upon  the  manner  of
obtaining facts,  thus ensuring only the ‘degree of  trustworthiness of  our proceeding’
(Peirce 1981-2010: vol. 3, 305). In this way Peirce transforms Kant’s a priori principle into
a methodological guarantee resting on a certain interpretation of the general statement
that ‘whatever is universally true is involved in the conditions of experience.’ So then
does  the  idea  of  necessary,  universal  truth  move  from Kant’s  a  priori  categories  to
Peirce’s methodological conditions. In such a passage, universal analytic truth loses part
of its ‘necessity’ by becoming merely ‘trustworthy.’ Still, the path Peirce follows remains
through the idea of necessity or universality. Like Kant with his schematism, Peirce is
after synthetic reasoning but gets to it through the analytic path. The outcome is that
ampliative or synthetic arguments do not tend to the necessity of content but to the
necessity of method.
10 In  1903’s  Lowell  Lectures Peirce  distinguishes  synthetic  from  analytic  judgments,
attributing the former to mathematics (hence to necessary reasoning) and the latter to
logic, which tries ‘to find out how inferences necessary and probable are composed.’ Once
again, logic is confined to the analytic scheme of composition/decomposition. Therefore,
reasoning can be necessary or ampliative, but the logician’s work is in both cases to find
its composition, confirming that analysis presides over our methodological research even
when, as in induction or hypotheses, it does not preside over the concepts at stake.
11 But  in  spite  of  Peirce’s  analytic  project,  pragmatism  chiefly  concerns  our  concrete
synthetic way of thinking. The synthetic process, however, is not the Kantian one that
seeks to attain, in both form and content, the kind of clearness that analysis has. All the
tools  Peirce  crafted,  from  the  list  of  categories to  perceptual  judgments,  from  the
pragmatic maxim to abduction, from existential graphs to rational instinct, describe a
changing synthetic process of thinking rather than the fixed analytic/synthetic reasoning
(and judgment) described by Kant. Peirce does not seem to have realized that his tools
were hinting towards a completely different path of thought. This tension between the
analytic background of his thought and the ‘true synthetic’ [only ‘synthetic’ from now on]
purpose of those same analyses explains also Peirce’s progressive shifts from Kant to
Hegel, and his more and more evident epistemic turn in the philosophy of science. This
tension shows a different kind of possibility. How can we define synthetic and analytic
starting from the change in thought that Peirce was tracking down without seeing the
different picture he was formulating?
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2. A New Paradigm: Analytics, Synthetics, Horotics 
12 We  proceed  with  some  new  definitions.  A  synthetic judgment  is  a  judgment  that
recognizes  identity  through  changes.  An  analytic judgment  is  a  judgment  that  loses
identity through changes. A horotic judgment (from horos, border)1 is a judgment that is
blind to identity through changes. In these three definitions one can change ‘judgment’
by ‘reasoning,’ opening thus new doors to inquire an extended gnoseological spectrum
(for further development of the definitions see Maddalena 2009).
13 Why do we need a new definition? One of the reasons for this change is required by
Peirce’s failed attempt to make complete sense of many tools he himself provided. We
already described the tension between Peirce’s analytic tools and his synthetic project.
Beyond that, there are other compelling reasons. One is the clear impasse of analytic
philosophy. That kind of philosophy, to which contemporary thought owes so much for
its  precision and productivity,  seems now stuck in a  scholasticism full  of  definitions
detached  from  experiential  reality  and  not  really  committed  to  improving  our
understanding of the world and its transformations. The fact is that analytic philosophy
has now come to manifest the incompleteness of the criterion of necessity/analyticity/
aprioricity  displayed by Kant.  And its  critiques,  most  importantly  Quine and Kripke,
offered only internal criticisms that failed to change the criterion itself. 
14 The good results of analytic philosophy are due to an efficient understanding of a certain
kind  of  logic  (first-order  classical  logic)  based  on  a  certain  kind  of  mathematics
(Cantorian set theory). But the ‘scholasticism’ currently in vogue underlines a limitation
of this logic: though analytic logic serves pretty well to split up definitions as called for
Kant’s  heritage,  it  is  intrinsically  an  endless  process.  From  science  to  grammar,
definitions rarely provide an exact fit: they are always too large or too tight. They are a
useful tool but are not the only one, and for sure not the one apt to grasp changes in
reality. New mathematics and new kinds of logics have already arisen (see section 5): the
time has come to try a new philosophical paradigm.
15 And why do we need this new definition we are proposing? Synthetic reasoning is the
original kind that we use in everyday life, and it needs a new paradigm that we will try to
expose and justify in the rest of this article. This study does not want to deny, minimize
or deconstruct the success of analytic reasoning as it has been carried on so far. We want
only to show that analytic reasoning needs and has always used a complementary type of
understanding in  order  to  work properly.  The  possibility  of  both and the  transition
between them are the pillars of this different view. We will see that the logical core of
synthetic  reasoning  is  both  analytically  and  synthetically  describable.  Arising  from
Peirce’s studies, this view immediately understands the logical importance of horotics, as
the indispensable complement to the two kinds proposed.
16 The first task in order to show the plausibility of our paradigm is to explain what is
change and how we can study it. We recall that Peirce’s phenomenology (phaneroscopy in
his  terminology)  postulates  the  existence  of  three  basic  categories  in  nature  and
knowledge:  firstness (immediacy,  possibility,  monadicity),  secondness (action-reaction,
actuality, binarism) and thirdness (mediation, necessity, continuity). We will understand
change from a  systemic  point  of  view,  in  the sense  that  a  given in-formation (first)
produces  a  new trans-formation  (third)  through precise  preparation,  correlation  and
creative techniques (seconds) which help to master and modify the initial data. Then,
A New Analytic/Synthetic/Horotic Paradigm
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
4
given an informational change, an analytic judgment emphasizes differences and thus
loses identities of data, focusing on the result of the transformation. On the other hand, a
synthetic judgment proposes an integrating view which recognizes fragments of identity,
focusing  on  similar  structural  processes  of  the  transformation.  Finally,  a  horotic
judgment defines a frontier, a border, a sort of pendular differential and integral calculus
which focuses  on the  possibility  of  relations,  that  is  on the  relative  spectrum of  the
transformation, and is thus blind to detect actual identities.
17 Horotics can, in turn, be approached from three distinct points of view: (i) extrinsically,
(ii) intrinsically,  (iii) synthetically.  Extrinsically  (i),  horotics  can  be  understood  as  a
completion of  the  classical  dyad  analysis/synthesis  with  respect  to  Peirce’s  three
categories. Since Greek thought, analysis and synthesis have appeared as complementary
polarities  (decomposition/composition,  part/all,  discontinuous/  continuous,  element/
structure,  etc.),  but  the  intermediate  transit  between  polarities  has  not  been  well
investigated. In a similar vein to the emergence of generalized quantifiers in Abstract
Model Theory à la Lindström, which study intermediate situations between the particular
(Ε) and the general (A) associated to intermediate classes of structures, horotics pretends
to open the way to general forms of reasoning beyond the polarity analysis/synthesis.
Intrinsically (ii), horotics can be seen as the exact study of the borders of knowledge, merging
thus with a strong tradition of critical thinkers akin to the visualization of frontiers and
their crossovers: Peirce (logic of continuity), Florenski (borders between science, art and
theology), Warburg (seismography of art history), Benjamin (residues in cultural studies),
Bakhtin (literary frontiers), Merleau-Ponty (Humanity as a border between Culture and
Nature),  Blumenberg  (evolution  of  metaphorical  images),  among  many  other
indispensable XXth century thinkers. Synthetically (iii), horotics achieves its full richness
through self-reference and self-regulation processes (frontiers of the frontier, limits of
the  limit,  progressive  refinement  of  borders,  etc.)  which  foster  the  growth  of
phenomenological, epistemical and metaphysical orders (topological object, continuous
logic, Peirce’s synechism, etc.).
18 In what follows, we will be detailing our general paradigm along three main case studies –
Peirce’s ‘mathematical gestures’ (section 3), Gödel’s synthetic approaches to intuitionistic
logic (section 4), forces in play in Contemporary Mathematics (section 5) –, and we will
finish prospecting its pertinence (section 6) for the coming years. 
 
3. The Paradigm Along Peirce’s Mathematical
Gestures
19 The triad analytics/synthetics/horotics glues naturally if  we use Peirce’s fundamental
insight: the concept of continuity, the ‘keystone’ of pragmatism. The study of continuity
from a mathematical  and a  logical  standpoint  shows how to understand change and
invariance. From the very beginning of Peirce’s intellectual proposal, continuity is paired
with representation, or cognition, becoming increasingly unified with it the more he was
discovering the real mathematical structure of continuity. There are many changes in
Peirce’s mathematical approach to the topic, but substantially they all focus on the proof
of Cantor’s theorem and paradox that Peirce independently discovered in the late 1890s.
With this  proof  Peirce  understood that  there  is  an infinite  series  of  multitudes  that
Cantor’s  set  theory  can  reach,  but  that  those  multitudes  are  always  bounded  to  an
imperfect or pseudo-continuity that depends on the unavoidable singularity of the initial
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definition of set or collection (Peirce 1976: vol. 3, 774-5). Peirce’s definition implies that a
collection is  an individual  whose existence depends on the regularities  among other
individuals. These ‘regularities’ can be identified by the characters its members possess
(ineunts) or exclude (exeunts) (Peirce 1976: vol. 3, 776). Therefore, if a collection implies by
definition a scheme of otherness ineunts-exeunts, the collection of all the collections, not
having  by  definition  any  exeunt,  is  unthinkable.  Cantor’s  paradox  mathematically
confirms this  evidence that  Peirce  first  attains  through the  categorical  and semiotic
status of individual. Real continuity is beyond any calculation that set theory can reach.
20 So what is this ‘real’ or ‘perfect’ continuity, which is beyond the ‘pseudo-continuity’ that
sets can reach? Peirce changed his mind many times on this issue, trying first to tie
continuity to necessity and then to possibility. Peirce first thought of making continuity
the complete evolution of reality,  the perfect ‘generality’  in his logical terms. In this
version  (1900-05),  any  singularity  is  a  rupture  of  perfect  continuity.  But  afterwards
(1907-14) he connected continuity to a more complex pattern in which continuity is a
possibility, namely a model that may be realized. Singularities are now realizations of
that original possibility tending to a general cohesiveness (Peirce 1931-35: vol. 4, § 642).
21 It is in this second sense that our conception of change must be seen. We can understand
change  as  a  perfect  continuity  of  possibilities  of  which  any  actual  occurrence  is  a
realization.  Continuity  is  a  law (general)  whose  internal  regularity  is  ‘an  immediate
connection’  that  we  can  understand  as  the  condition  of  every  possible  realization
(possibility). We can define a Peircean perfect continuum by four characters: modality
(plasticity),  transitivity,  generality,  and reflexivity,  each underlying one aspect of the
relationship between the parts and the whole of continuity, as seen in Zalamea 2001.
Generality  is  the  law  of  cohesiveness  among  parts  beyond  any  individual  and  any
possibility of metrically measuring it; modality means plasticity, namely the fact that a
continuum  is  not  tied  to  actualities  but  involves  both  possibility  and  necessity;
transitivity is the internal passage between modalities (possibility, actuality, and general
necessity); reflexivity means that any part shall have the same properties of the whole to
which it belongs.
22 According to Peirce’s ‘extreme’ realism, continuity coincides with reality and, thus, it
founds mathematics. Since we discover continuity at the ‘end’ of inquiry on sets, it is an a
posteriori  foundation  that  happens  while  we  are  ‘doing  mathematics’  through  our
scribing graphs and diagrams whether on the sheet of the mind or on some physical
sheet. Mathematical diagrams work because they act synthetically, namely – according to
an old Kantian definition – in mathematics we are dealing with universals in particulars,
while in philosophy we have to deal with universals abstracted from particulars.  The
great power of generalization of mathematics is due to these contracted universals. We
will call ‘mathematical gesture’ this kind of synthetic approach to mathematics through
‘doing.’
23 There is  a  second interrelated approach to  change in  Peirce’s  late  writings.  It  is  the
approach through logical modalities as such. Possibility, actuality, necessity, became the
way in which Peirce explained transition within the continuum itself. If Cantor’s paradox
showed  the  existence  of  an  original  higher  continuum  of  reality  that  exceeds  our
computations, modalities define the internal life of this continuity. But in what do these
modalities  consist?  Possibility  is  the  mode  of  reality  in  which  the  principle  of
contradiction does not hold. Actuality or existence is the mode of reality in which both
the principle of contradiction and excluded third hold. Necessity is the mode of reality in
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which the principle of excluded third does not hold, that is, both alternatives can be false.
Peirce’s short version of the discovered ontological stands of modalities sums them up as
‘may be’s’ (possibility), ‘actualities,’ and ‘would be’s’ (necessity or generality). All three
modalities are ‘real’  – meaning that they are independent from what any number of
minds can think – or rather they coincide with the evolving continuity of reality. Reality
actualizes possibilities and tries to develop them as generalities. According to Peirce, it is
impossible to describe reality without modalities.
24 The logic  of  modalities  implies  a  different  understanding of  stechiology (doctrine  of
elements). A term can be vague, determinate, and general (Peirce 1998: 350-3) according
to  the  characters  inhering  in  it.  If  any  character  is  predicated  universally  and
affirmatively or recognized as inherent the term is determinate. If it requires further
determination by the utterer,  it  is  vague;  if  it  requires further determination by the
interpretant it is general. Vagueness, determination, and generality fall under the same
description of the logical modalities. What we have here is a transition in determination
which is based on the ontological reality of the logical modalities. A term or a concept can
be vague and become determinate and even general (and vice versa). 
25 Vagueness has such an importance because it is the possible state of things from which
ideas stem. Possibility as firstness can also be understood as a not yet actualized border
from where actions (secondness) and ideas (thirdness) eventually emerge. The horotics of
knowledge cannot thus dispense the complete triad vagueness/incarnation/abstraction.
Moreover, it is precisely in the horotic transposition between particulars (seconds) and
generals (thirds) where many logical forces enter the panorama. Creativity spurs from
initial vagueness and many correlations between imagination (first) and reason (third)
can be then precisely stated along the synthetic/horotic paradigm. 
26 Logical features respect the four characteristics of the continuum: reflexivity, generality,
possibility,  transitivity.  Every  element  has  the  same properties  of  general  modalities
(reflexivity); the passage among vagueness, determination, and generality (transitivity) is
the  law  of  the  development  of  meaning  through  categories  (generality);  this  latter
depends  on  the  possible  inchoative  status  of  vague  meaning  (possibility).  Now,
mathematical and logical characteristics of continuity showed what change is, and we are
ready  to  explain  what  we  mean  by  ‘recognizing  an  identity  through  changes,’  our
definition of synthetic reasoning.
27 For our explanation we will rely on Peirce’s Existential Graphs (hereafter EG), his iconic-
based logics. EG were the way in which Peirce himself sought to represent continuity, and
it is possibly one of the few scientific strategies of getting to the structure of ‘recognizing’
(see Roberts 1973). EG are the iconic formalization of logic of propositions (Alpha), first
order (Beta), and modalities (Gamma). In comparison to formalization by symbols that
happened in the same years, EG display a greater simplicity and uniformity (same rules for
the three fragments, propositional, first order, modal). EG were still analytic, but their
overall project was a synthetic one (Zalamea 2010). Using the phrase introduced above,
they  are  a  kind  of  ‘mathematical  gesture’  and  from  this  point  of  view  they  are
synthetically conveying universals into particulars.
28 The synthetic ‘doing’ of the EG permits ‘evidence’ and ‘generality.’ Both properties are
fundamental in Peirce’s understanding of mathematics; and semiotics gave him the tools
to understand their actual working. ‘Evidence’ is due to the iconic property of the graphs.
Icons give to diagrams the fundamental visual character that makes them ‘graspable’
through perception.  ‘Generality,’  is  due  to  the  so  called ‘hypostatic  abstraction’  that
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enables us to consider as object, and thus as diagram, any quality or aspect of reality. This
kind of abstraction is the logical tool through which we pass “from ‘good’ to ‘goodness’
and the like” (Peirce 1998: 270n). The combination of the properties of ‘evidence’ and
‘generality’  accounts  for  our  capacity  of  reading a diagram in a  general  way and to
understand its relations. Generalization happens in ‘doing’ or ‘scribing’ those diagrams. If
the  generalization is  the  analytic  result  of  the diagrams,  diagrams are  the synthetic
happening of generals. ‘Recognizing’ is part of this synthetic ‘happening’ and should have
the same evidence and generalization.
29 Recognizing always implies an object: ‘recognizing something’; and the easiest way to
look at it is to look at the case of identity. Here we will focus on an identity that is not a
plain correspondence A=A, which according to Peirce himself is only a degenerate form of
the real identity A=B. Identities are always passing through changes. A=A is the static
correspondence  drawn  from  the  set-theoretical  definition  of  multitudes  and  it  is  a
simplification of a ‘more primitive’ form of relation (Peirce 1976: vol. 4, 325-8).
30 Given our diagrams with their power of evidence and generalization, how can they help
us understand our ‘recognizing an identity’? In order to answer this question we have to
represent both the continuity of change and the identity we want to inquire within this
change. The first kind of continuity, the continuity of reality, is represented by the sheet
of assertion. The sheet represents the universe of discourse we are dealing with in Alpha
and Beta parts (logic of propositions and first order). But in the Gamma graphs (modal
logic),  when  we  want  to  represent  change  through  modalities,  we  need  a  different
continuum that ‘must clearly have more dimensions’ (Peirce 1931-35: vol. 4, § 512). This
plastic multidimensional continuum is more ‘original,’ and the sheet of assertion of the
Alpha and Beta parts is only a picture of this original continuum. In this continuum we
are really scribing not the propositions as they actually are, but as they might be. We
could think of them as marks or qualities, which cannot be numerable anymore – they are
not assertions anymore – and they will exceed any multitude, according to our definition
of  ‘perfect  continuity’.  This  multidimensional  continuum is  apt  to  represent  time or
‘Becoming’ (Peirce 1976: vol. 4, 330).
31 Now that we have the tool for representing the continuum of change, we can look for
identity. In the Beta Graphs we have a graphical tool for identity: the line of identity, that
can solve the problem of quantifiers. The line represents the existential quantifier when
it is evenly enclosed and the universal quantifier through an appropriate nested double
cut. But the definition becomes more complex when we do not have to deal with the two
dimensional sheet of assertion, but with the multidimensional plastic continuum. When
we  scribe  a  line  of  identity  on  the  multidimensional  plastic  continuum  we  are
representing  the identity  into  the  continuum  of  possibilities.  The  line  of  identity
continues to assert the identity of the individuals denoted by its extremities, but here it
means the continuity of possibilities of an individual considered as a changing object in
its becoming, i.e. the winner of Leipzig and the loser of Waterloo. This switch from using
a line of identity on a sheet of assertion to using it on a multidimensional continuum
implies the passage from an Assertoric view of Truth to a broader conception of truth and
identity based on possibility. Identity is not anymore A=A but a non-purely-symbolizable
iconic identity passing from A to B. 
32 This switch also implies that the line of identity when it is scribed on a multidimensional
continuum  must  become  a  line  of  teridentity,  namely  a  line  in  which  one  of  the
extremities is a loose end. Teridentity represents two relations of co-identity and means
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that there are two different relations of identity that have in common one end and part of
the line. The loose end of the line of teridentity means that there is or was also a different
possibility even if it is or was not being actualized. It means that we know identity as a
continuity but we do not know at which point it would stop and the point might be or
have been different from the one we have. We have to allow the possibility that brute
existence  will  be  different  since  we  are  not  representing  actuality  but  potentiality.
Finally, the line of identity has a direction or an aim because we draw it starting from one
point and ceasing at another.
33 This is the tool Peirce crafted to define a changing identity analytically, but in order to
grasp the synthetic view of identity, it is not EG’s logical analytic use that is needed. The
interesting features of the line of identity and teridentity come from Peirce’s comment on
the nature and the meaning of it: the line of identity, and a fortiori the line of teridentity,
is another ‘perfect continuum’ along with the multidimensional continuum of assertion
and, thus, it has the same properties we ascribed to continuity.
34 The line of identity is made of icons interpreted, and in so far is made of possibilities
whose realizations are connected by a general rule (possibility and generality). The loose
end guarantees the fullness of reflexivity: any part of the line, included the ends, are
possibilities that might be realized according to a general law. Besides, every single dot
actualized on the multidimensional  continuum realizes  a  possibility  according to the
general  law,  and  might  have  a  different  branch  –  the  loose  end  –  as  a  different
actualization of the same possibility. So there is a transition from possibility to necessity
through actuality. The translation of modalities in terms of vagueness, determination,
and generalization is  easy to  see:  identity  is  a  progressive determination of  possible
qualities  tending  toward  a  generalization  (tending  to  identify  forever  the  winner  of
Leipzig and the loser of Waterloo) during the development (the ‘becoming’) expressed by
the continuum within which they are inscribed.
35 How can this representation of identity be also the representation of ‘recognizing an
identity’?  Peirce  could  unify  ‘identity’  and ‘recognizing  an identity’  by  virtue  of  the
practical  ‘scribing’  on the  sheet  of  assertion or  on the  multidimensional  continuum.
‘Recognizing an identity’  in EG means to draw a line of identity between two points,
knowing that  there  is  always  a  different,  loose  possibility.  The  drawing itself  is  our
recognizing; in EG there is no recognition without the actual drawing of the line. It can be
a  mental  or  a  virtual  act,  but  it  has  to  be  a  kind  of  diagram  within  a  general
interpretation. It is what we call a mathematical gesture.
36 What is a gesture? Gesture is any performed act which carries a meaning (from gero = to
bear, to carry). We can say we really understood something when we are ready to act
according to our ideas; so, it is the performance that synthetically involves our reasoning.
But if every gesture carries meaning, not every gesture serves to recognize an identity.
So, any gesture is meaningful, but not every gesture embodies a synthetic reasoning. In
order to understand ‘syntheticity’ we have to look for a ‘perfect or complete gesture,’ a
gesture that respects all the characters we found following EG.
37 We should call a ‘perfect or complete gesture’ a gesture which has all the semiotic elements
blended together almost equally. Now, for a gesture to be perfect it has to be a general
law (symbol) that generates replicas; it is actual when it indicates its particular object
(index); and it expresses different possibilities of aspects of the object which it refers to
(icon).  The three semiotic  characteristics  describe what a  perfect  gesture is:  creative
because of possible aspects, singular in its individuality, recognizable for its conformity to
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an established pattern.  Moreover,  gestures  carry  a  possible  and vague meaning that
progressively gets determinate till a new habit is established. So we can easily find in this
movement generality, modality, and transitivity.
38 Our new paradigm implies that a synthetic judgment (and reasoning) is a judgment (and
reasoning)  that  recognizes  –  with evidence –  identity  through changes.  How can we
perform  this  reasoning? We  do  that  through  perfect  gestures,  where  creativity,
particularity and generality overlap. Perfect gestures – like the line of identity in EG –
save identity through changes because of their continuous semiotic nature. We obtain
analytic reasoning by differentiation and horotic reasoning through a pendular ‘integral
and differential calculus’ (see section 5). Analytic reasoning loses the identity through
changes because it is concerned with breaking up the identity, as its etymology suggests
(from analyo, discomposing, breaking up). It is very profitable in many cases but perfectly
hopeless in many of our everyday businesses, and sometimes also – like in the case of
discoveries or assessments of meaning – in many of our scientific activities (see section 5,
for the case of Contemporary mathematics). A horotic reasoning does not recognize an
identity,  but  it  is  probably the richer  state of  our knowledge,  the one in which our
primeval beliefs lie.
 
4. The Paradigm Along Gödel’s Work 
39 Gödel’s  work  is  an  outstanding  example  of  the  production  of  a  great  logician/
mathematician/philosopher,  being  able  to  explore  in  depth  the  full triad  analytics/
synthetics/horotics. If his analytic power has been celebrated many times, his synthetic
vision has been less so, in spite of his lifelong interest for intuitionistic logic (from Gödel
1932 up to Gödel  1972),  his  unusual  physical  imagination (Gödel  1949,  1952)  and his
enormous  output  of  philosophical  reflections  (most  still  unpublished,  beyond  the
‘standard’ compilation Collected Works III;  for an original, ‘non standard’ approach, see
Cassou-Noguès  2007).  Gödel’s  comprehensive  and  correlative  interest  in  logic,
mathematics and philosophy rests in fact on a synthetic understanding of knowledge.
Moreover, in fairly detailed moments of Gödel’s work one can disclose strong horotic
forces, as we will indicate in this section.
40 In  one of  his  philosophical  discussions,  Gödel  proposes  a  ‘general  schema of  possible
philosophical world-views’ which proves fruitful ‘for the analysis of philosophical doctrines
admissible in special contexts, in that one either arranges them in this manner or, in
mixed cases, seeks out their materialistic and spiritualistic elements’ (Gödel 1961: 375, our
emphasis). Here, a synthetic perspective (‘schema,’ ‘world-views’) is presented first, and
then  applied  to  the  analysis  of  philosophical  doctrines  along  pragmatic  situations
(‘special  contexts,’  ‘mixed  cases’).  A  pendulous  horotics  between  matter  and  spirit
governs the schema, and it is precisely in the border, mixed cases where the schema
comes  to  be  the  most  fruitful.  Further,  if  we  see  that  ‘skepticism,  materialism  and
positivism stand on one side, spiritualism, idealism and theology on the other,’  Gödel
affirms that ‘it is a familiar fact, even a platitude, that the development of philosophy
since the Renaissance has by and large gone from right to left – not in a straight line, but with
reverses, yet still, on the whole’ (Gödel 1961: 375, our emphasis; ‘right’/spiritualism, ‘left’/
materialism). The pendulum, with its back-and-forth horotics, is unavoidable. For Gödel,
the deep mathematical concepts lie on right, against Hilbert’s formalism tending to the
left.  Then, beyond the ‘Hilbertian combination of materialism and aspects of classical
A New Analytic/Synthetic/Horotic Paradigm
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
10
mathematics’  (Gödel  1961:  381),  a  ‘workable  combination’  (Gödel  1961:  383),  which
reflects the idea that ‘truth lies in the middle’ (Gödel 1961: 381), should be proposed.
Surprisingly,  Gödel finds that such a middle horotics should be founded on Husserl’s
phenomenology,  in order to capture an in-depth perception of  mathematical  objects.
Thus Gödel comes very close to Peirce’s ideas, as we have presented them in the previous
sections, even if Gödel probably never knew Peirce’s phaneroscopy and philosophy of
mathematics (in Gödel’s published work, there is only one reference to Peirce, on his
calculus of relations (Gödel 1944: 120)).
41 On the technical side, all Gödel’s papers on intuitionism include outstanding examples of
synthetic and horotic strategies. His very first paper on intuitionism (Gödel 1932) exhibits
already a precise synthetic property (non existence of a finite model which would capture
provability  of  the  intuitionistic  calculus  Int),  and  a  precise  horotic one  (existence  of
infinite systems between intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi). Gödel 1933a
extends, to first order, part of Glivenko’s translatability criterion between Int and the
classical  propositional  calculus,  presenting,  first,  an intuitionistic Herbrand system H’ 
with number variables (synthetic construction with enough signs for the semantics), and,
second,  a  translation of  the classical  properties  of  partial  recursive functions into H’
(horotic transformation of calculability into intuitionistic provability). Gödel 1933b shows
a new translation (horotic transformation) between Int and modal S4,  and conjectures
their equiconsistency (full synthetic comparison). Finally, Gödel’s famous Dialectica paper
(Gödel  1958)  presents  a  translation  of  provability  in  Heyting  Arithmetic  into
computability  of finite  type  functionals.  Both  the  fairly  detailed  arithmetic  systems
(synthetics)  and  the  translations  (horotics)  in  play,  acquire  there  in-depth  stratified
refinements.
42 One can understand Gödel as a thinker extremely sensible both to the recto and verso of a
given  situation  (not  only  mathematical:  his  biography  is  full  of  such  borderline
sensitivities). We contend here that it is precisely thanks to this horotic temperament
that Gödel’s genius may have emerged. The presence of important horotic lines in Gödel’s
work can also in fact be signaled in what may be his most celebrated logical results. On
one side, if, in his doctoral thesis, Gödel proves completeness of classical first-order logic,
just one year later he discovers the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic. The thin line
where the tendency to insure completeness breaks (following Post, Presburger, Herbrand
and  Gödel  himself)  is  a  frontier  that  could  only  be  conceived  by  an  unusual
mathematician, open both to the borders of proofs and to a via negativa approach to
knowledge. Beyond Herbrand’s bounded quantification, Gödel discovers the exact border
– full induction – where incompleteness phenomena begin to occur. On the other side, if
with the constructible universe Gödel proves the relative consistency of the Continuum
Hypothesis (CH),  in his later years he proceeds again ‘through the looking glass’  and
postulates  natural  axioms that  force  c=Χ2,  negating  thus  (CH).  All  these  examples  in
Gödel’s  work  –  philosophical  and  mathematical  at  large,  logically  detailed  in  his
intuitionistic  contributions  –  show  perhaps  the  pertinence  of  our  newly  defined
analytics/synthetics polarity and his natural extension to horotics. 
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5. The Paradigm Along Contemporary Developments
of Mathematics
43 The XXth Century French School  in  Philosophy of  Mathematics  (with names such as
Poincaré, Brunschvicg, Cavaillès, Lautman, Desanti, Vuillemin, Châtelet, Petitot, Badiou)
has  stressed  the  central  role  of  mathematical  gestures  for  a  fair  understanding  of
mathematical creativity. Mathematical practice, contrasted with logical architecture, has
to deal permanently with blind spots,  obstructions, inconsistencies,  contradictions.  In
such  a  perilous  mathematical  activity,  often  paths  are  explored  through  structural
equilibrium or  esthetic  awareness  (Shelah considers  ‘beauty’  as  the  main  reason for
studying Set Theory), before rearranging the envisioned ideas on a sound logical basis. In
these endeavors, both synthetic and horotic perspectives are fundamental. 
44 Albert  Lautman,  possibly  the  most  original  philosopher  of  Modern  mathematics
(1830-1950),  had stressed five main characteristics of  mathematical  ‘higher’  creativity
(Galois, Riemann, Hilbert, E. Cartan, mainly studied by Lautman): (i) complex hierarchy of
mathematical theories, irreducible with respect to intermediate deductive systems, (ii)
semantic  richness,  irreducible  to  syntactical  considerations,  (iii) unity  of structural
methods  behind  the  previous  multiplicity,  (iv) dynamics  of  mathematical  practice/
gesture, (v) theorematic back-and-forth between unity and multiplicity (Lautman 2005).
Lautman, a good friend of Charles Ehresmann, had anticipated the growing emergence of
Category  Theory  (see,  in  particular,  his  brilliant  analysis  of  the  local/global  polarity
before  the  emergence  of  Sheaf  Theory  (Lautman  2010)),  and  our  synthetic/horotic
paradigm can also be traced back to Lautman’s work. The global view fostered by (i) and
(ii) require in fact synthetic approaches, while the bordering/dialectical view underlined
in  (iii)-(v) deals  directly  with  an  horotic  approximation  to  knowledge.  The  dynamic
structuralism  in  Philosophy  of  Mathematics  proposed  some  decades  ago  (Awodey,
Hellman, see Shapiro 2005), fully developed in the 1930’s by Lautman, is thus much closer
to a synthetic/horotic (mathematical) paradigm than to the analytic (logical) paradigm
which encompassed the main ‘Philosophy of Mathematics’ (in fact, ‘Philosophy of Logic’)
schools in the XXth century.
45 Extending  Lautman’s  project  to  Contemporary  mathematics  (1950-today),  we  have
underlined (Zalamea 2008) some features of contemporary mathematical creativity where
the synthetic/horotic viewpoint helps to organize better the panorama: (vi) arithmetical
structural  impurity  (Langlands,  Deligne,  Wiles,  etc.),  (vii) systematical  geometrization
(sheaves,  co-homologies,  geometric  logic,  etc.),  (viii) freeness  and  schematization
(groupoids, categories, topoi, motives, etc.), (ix) fluxion and deformation (non linearity,
non commutativity,  non elementarity,  quantization,  etc.),  (x) reflexivity (classification,
monster  model,  fixed  points,  etc.)  In  the  amazingly  productive  period  since  1950
(following Dieudonné, 99 % of our actual mathematical knowledge would have therein
emerged), the mathematical practice permanently breaks all analytic borders, merging
together  very  diverse  subfields  of  mathematics.  Synthetic  mixing  is  a  source  of
inventiveness, and the horotic crossing of problems and ideas from different fields is a
source of freshness for the discipline. 
46 Grothendieck’s presence behind the developmental lines (vi)-(x) is central. Since many
appearances  of  synthetic  and  horotic  forces  vertebrate  Grothendieck’s  work  –  his
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schemes, topoi or motives, crucially influential for Contemporary mathematics – one can
also measure the importance of the synthetic/horotic paradigm for a fair understanding
of the Philosophy of Mathematics. Grothendieck 1960-67 unifies and synthesizes, in the
schemes,  Riemann’s  vision  (understanding  of  a  complex  curve  through  the  ring  of
meromorphic functions over the curve) and Galois/Dedekind’s vision (understanding of
an algebraic variety through the spectrum of its maximal ideals). A horotic transposition
helps to capture together, in a general setting, the ideas of non ramification and local/
global gluing (through sheaves on the spectrum of prime ideals). Grothendieck 1960-69
axiomatizes, through topoi, the movements of relative mathematics, generalizes the notion
of point, discovers new geometric invariants and constructs the correct (co)homologies
which would eventually lead to the solution of Weil’s conjectures. Combining a synthetic
view (mathematics from the top)  and horotic gestures (multitude of  new definitions,
theorems  and  examples),  Grothendieck  explores  systematically  the  borders  of
mathematical  regions.  On  the  other  hand,  inventing  motives,  Grothendieck  looks  for
archetypes which lie at ‘the heart or soul’ of mathematical thought (Grothendieck 1985:
45). Beyond the multiplicity of (co)homologies, motives look for an initial or generic unity
behind  the  various  algebraic  attempts  to  capture  the  fundamental  mathematical
contradiction discreteness/ continuity. 
47 Some basic trends in Contemporary mathematics can be described through an iterated
horotics between forms of idealism and realism (for a detailed account,  see (Zalamea
2008: 99-150)). Eidal mathematics (from eidos, idea, and idein, vision) encompasses many
works  which  open  new  territories  through  very  general  ideas  and  strong  visual
capabilities  (Serre,  Langlands,  Lawvere,  Shelah  can  be  seen  as  such  visionaries,  for
example). Quiddital mathematics (from quidditas,  ‘what it is’) combines the capacity to
work with rare abstract machineries and concrete physical problems (as in the work of
Atiyah,  Lax,  Connes  or  Kontsevich).  Archeal mathematics  (from arkhê,  beginning,  and
arkhên,  commanding) unravels archetypical invariants along the eidal/quiddital transit,
such  as  Friedman’s  reverse  mathematics,  Freyd’s  allegories,  Zilber’s  trichotomy
(extended by Hrushovski) or Gromov’s h-principle. In each case, the dynamical forces of
Contemporary mathematics, always crossing frontiers, always contaminating its diverse
techniques,  reveal  a  horotic  factum difficult  to  understand  from  the  perspectives  of
Analytic Philosophy.
48 An example of such a crucial mathematical contamination is obtained around the double
analytic/synthetic  content  of  the  notion  of  sheaf  (one  of  the  main  conceptual  and
historical border lines between Modern and Contemporary mathematics). On an analytic
approach,  the sheaf glues a coherent covering of  neighborhoods,  and,  on a synthetic
perspective,  it  produces  a  section  which  adequately  preserves  local  properties  of
projections and restrictions (see figure 1): 
 
Figure 1. Sheaves from Complementary Perspectives
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49 If we transpose the analytic notion of ‘covering’ through the synthetic hierarchy ‘section-
preservation-projection-restriction’, we obtain a horotic transformation that we may call
Grothendieck’s  Transform.  In  fact,  the  emergence  of  Grothendieck’s  topologies,  at  the
beginning of  Topos  Theory,  comes precisely  from such a  synthetic  understanding of
covers.  But  even  better,  Grothendieck’s  ‘rising  sea’  technique  is  a  profound
methodological  instance  of  that  horotic  transposition:  to  understand a  mathematical
concept/object (metaphorically a nut, with its hard shell), just cover it through diverse
synthetic categories and functorial contexts (rising tides) until the concept is properly
understood (the ‘nourishing flesh’ is then analytically uncovered, as the shell dissolves)
(Grothendieck 1985: 552-3). 
50 Grothendieck’s  Transform  uses  two  distinct  forms  of  understanding.  Through
transversality, it introduces a reference lattice where contrasts, coherence, asymptotic
behavior and gluings can operate. In this way, for example, a non absolute, non analytic,
notion  of  truth  emerges,  where  a  density  of  correct  correlations  stands  as  an
approximation to truth, without invoking an ideal limit or a correspondence theory. On
the other hand, through coverings, it introduces a dynamic fluidity, crucial for a sound
comprehension  of  saturation  processes  in  mathematics  (a  central  characteristic  first
studied  in  all  details  by  Lautman).  Our  epistemological  perspectives  change  then
radically,  just  by  the  simple  fact  of  smoothing  the  situation:  beyond  polarities,  the
mediating transformations are integrated in an evolving fabric, closer to mathematical
practice. Transversality in the work of Serre and in Langland’s program, adjoint dialectics
in Lawvere,  tame coverings in Shelah’s pcf theory,  Atiyah’s index theorem, harmonic
analysis applied to the non euclidean wave equation in Lax’s work, Freyd’s intermediate
categories,  Zilber’s  proto-geometry,  Gromov’s  h-principle,  are  very  precise  examples
where  transversality  of  coverings  is  fundamental.  Since  we  are  listing  many  great
creative  advances  in  Contemporary  mathematics  that  cannot  be  understood  from
analytic perspectives, a natural space for a Synthetic/Horotic Philosophy of Mathematics
emerges.
51 Beyond the usual ideal/real polarity, mathematical practice, particularly at the high level
of Contemporary advances, is in fact producing an extremely interesting epistemological
back-and-forth. The back-and-forth postulates not just a systematic oscillation between
extremes,  but  one  which  is  rooted  on  a  coherent  covering  of  the  diverse  partial
approximations. Lindström’s use of Cantor’s back-and-forth in Abstract Model Theory is a
paradigmatic use of the idea, but one can also detect it in Grothendieck’s elucidation of
the functorial  properties  of  Teichmüller’s  space,  in  Shelah’s  structural  amalgamation
techniques, in Gromov’s polynomial group growth, etc. All these processes reflect partial,
hierarchical,  distributed  knowledge,  which  can  be  correctly  understood  only  from
perspectives open to transits  along borders of  mathematics,  just  what the synthetic/
horotic paradigm indicates. 
 
6. Forms of Synthetic/Horotic Reasoning for the XXIst
Century
52 Mathematical  practice,  as  we have seen in previous sections –  Peirce’s  mathematical
gesture and his logic of continuity, Gödel’s synthetic interplay between intuitionism and
classical logic, contemporary mathematical developments along Grothendieck’s legacy –
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fosters  a  full  triadic  vision  where  analytic,  synthetic  and  horotic  techniques  should
complement each other. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of Philosophy of Mathematics,
the analytic preponderance in the XXth century has been overwhelming, and a balance is
far from having been reached. In this final section we will (i) present the rough lines of
how one should understand a Synthetic Philosophy, complementary to Analytic Philosophy,
(ii) indicate  a  back-and-forth  horotics  between  the  two  approaches,  (iii) prospect  a
generalization of the situation for more extended cultural contexts, beyond mathematics.
53 A Synthetic  Philosophy captures  many ideas  from what  has  been called ‘Continental
Philosophy,’ but a systemic and systematic counterbalance with Analytic Philosophy can
render clearer the panorama (see figure 2). Our main bet for the emergence and growth of
such a Synthetic Philosophy may be summed up in the following diagram:
 
Figure 2. A New Paradigm for XXISt Century
54 After due attention given to the right column in the preceding diagram, a more balanced
understanding of the Philosophy of Mathematics should emerge in the next coming years.
A full horotic back-and-forth between the two columns would then accommodate the
guidelines of mathematical  practice.  In particular, the very complex ‘Gromov’s cloud’
(Langevin 2000) – which tries to examine, under a new metaphor, exponential nodes,
dense  gluings,  local  wells,  and  all  sort  of  multidimensional  objects  in  Hilbert’s
mathematical  tree  –  indicates  that  new  geometric  forms,  particularly  sensible  to
synthetic and horotic perspectives, are invading mathematical knowledge.
55 The philosophical generalization of the suggested scheme should show the breadth of its
perspectives.  Philosophy  can  find  a  new  vein  in  the  synthetic/horotic  paradigm,
eventually escaping the boundaries self-attributed according to the analytic pattern. We
can  easily  observe  that  good  philosophical  fruits  matured  from  the  mathematical
discoveries of the past two centuries. To them we owe the precision of the philosophy of
language, the development of forms of artificial intelligence and their tools, good works
in logic and their applications to informatics, a closer focus on single ethical, esthetical,
and even ontological issues. As we pointed out, the analytic pattern from which all of that
sprang involved a breaking down of problems to smaller and smaller theoretical pieces, in
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an endless run toward an impossible ultimate element. The new synthetic pattern built
on  ‘recognizing  an  identity’  will  re-write  epistemology,  ethics,  metaphysics,  and
pedagogy according to the same complementary attitude that we fostered all along in this
paper. Semiotics and pragmatism will warrant the full horotic back and forth between the
two patterns. 
56 A few hints may suggest future ways of inquiry. In epistemology there are many topics
that will have a different treatment and a complete list is impossible at this stage. But
some topics are immediately questionable according to the synthetic/horotic pattern.
First, we will look for a semiotic description of ‘gestures’ that can explain their working
both analytically and synthetically. From Peirce’s Existential Graphs we will be able to
observe  the  semiotic  structure  of  gestures  understood  as  embodied  in  synthetic
reasoning.  When  the  pattern  is  established  from  a  philosophical  perspective,  it  is
important  to  verify  its  plausibility  in  relationship  with  the  actual  development  of
mathematics.  Second,  many  epistemological  fields  that  did  not  find  a  complete
explanation  in  the  analytic  pattern  can  be  faced  now  through  a  synthetic  view  of
reasoning relying upon semiotic based gestures. Among these unsolved topics, it is worth
recalling:  i)  reference  theory  –  so  far  blocked  in  the  sterile  alternative  between
descriptivism  and  causalism;  ii)  the  theory  of  hypotheses  –  often  mistaken  as  a
psychological attitude; iii) creative processes, that have to be understood from both a
logical and ontological perspective; iv) personal identity, which is directly connected with
the  ratio  of  synthetic  reasoning  as  ‘recognizing  an  identity’;  v)  the  theory  of  the
development  of  language,  which  can  now  be  comprehended  from  the  outset  as  a
synthetic phenomenon of meaning, in transition from vagueness to generality. Third, our
proposed synthetic/horotic pattern can change the approach to ethical and pedagogical
issues. From the personal identity issue sprouts a different conception of ethics which has
to  be  studied  and  developed.  Gestures  can  encompass  and  overtake  the  alternative
between a  narrative  historical  pattern for  ethics  and a  deontological  one.  An ethics
founded on gestures can account for the continuity of moral personality and for our
embodying rules and norms in a technical way, thanks to the mathematical ground and
the semiotic structure of gestures. Finally, a pedagogy based on gestures should deepen
the insight of Dewey’s theory of education, which intended to mingle theory and practice,
problems and solutions, precision of technical teaching and broad views of the unity of
wisdom. Synthetic/horotic reasoning will overcome the fatal distinction between human
and  natural  sciences  that  has  determined  a  specialization  without  creativity  and  a
creation without precise method.
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NOTES
1. Since 2001, through diverse books and articles, we had been wandering around the ideas of
frontier,  border,  thirdness  and vagueness,  in  order  to  get  a  natural  completion  of  the  dyad
analytics/synthetics, when Roberto Perry offered us (2009) the perfect, unspoiled, term: horotics.
We gratefully acknowledge his support.
ABSTRACTS
We study a  contemporary need to  complement  analytic  philosophy with pendular,  synthetic
approaches. We provide new definitions of the dyad analytics/synthetics and complete it with a
natural  third,  horotics.  Some  historical  trends  to  support  a  synthetic/horotic  paradigm  are
studied:  (i) Peirce’s  ideas  around  his  logic  of  continuity  –  non  Cantorian  continuum  and
existential  graphs  –  emphasizing  the  importance  of  mathematical  gestures,  (ii) Gödel’s
understanding of  intuitionism as a synthetic  counterpart  of  classical  logic,  along with a new
horotic  approach  to  his  work,  (iii) Contemporary  mathematical  achievements  (1950-2000),
difficult to understand from analytical philosophy perspectives. Finally, we indicate some main
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